Mark Cramer
C & X Report

C&X 27

CONTENTS
Editorial
Anatomy of a Right Decision
Lessons from 2005
The Longshot Muse
C&X Cafe: Rebound Method. Toteboard Tracking. On Zigging and Zagging.
The Big Win: the Tribulations of the Automatic Bet
The Final Word, from Bill Duncliffe

EDITORIAL
Please excuse me for letting so much time pass by without a stakes weekend. In the next issue we’ll announce our next stakes weekend. In the meantime, a new year is here and this issue concentrates on the idea of reaching a new level in our horse betting by not repeating the mistakes of the previous year.
Speaking seasonally, please remember that we will soon be upon the season when the two-year olds will be coming back as threes, and competing against three-year olds whose Beyer figs come from 2006 races. Between year two and three of a racing life, the horse will have matured and his speed will increase. Therefore it wouldn’t be fair to compare the 2yo speed figs of one horse with teh 3yo figs of another.
This means that a lightly-raced 2yo coming back after a layoff could offer a generous payoff because his speed figures will appear to be slower than those of horses who already have 3yo speed figs posted.
The 2yo comebacker angle is especially potent when the 2yo is a maiden special weight horse with only one or two losing races (no more) as a two-year old. We want this horse to be entered in a maiden special weight race, as a show of positive trainer intention, as opposed to a maiden claimer. Using only trainers with at least a 12 percent hit rate, this method shows an 8 percent profit and this C&X research has been validated and revalidated by reputable researchers.
The other optimal angle, with a lower average mutual but higher percentage of winners is a horse that broke its maiden as a two, showing no more than two races in his baby racing, and then comes back after a layoff as a three, and must be in allowance non-winners of 1, rather than a claiming race, as a measure of positive trainer intention.
These two sister methods are potent because the horses we like will have lower speed figs than the 3yo speed figs of the other horses in the field.
These seasonable methods should kick in some time in February, and swell in March, April and May.



ANATOMY OF A RIGHT DECISION: PLAYER PROFILE
Bill Duncliffe began playing the horses seriously in his late 20s. Always a good handicapper, nevertheless he sensed he was underachieving and was searching for a hidden ingredient that would get him over an invisible obstacle and onto a higher lever of play.
Before making a significant discovery, he first had to come to the realization that the answer would be found somewhere within himself: some combination of inner fortitude and intellectual inspiration.
He was already accustomed to the idea of finding strength from within in order to arrive at a new plateau for he was a runner who was capable of handling pain for gain. In the wake of a foot ailment that would not go away unless he stopped pounding the path, he switched to cycling and suddenly a whole new world opened up, a smoother and more enjoyable way to challenge himself.
He had no need to compete against others but he was highly competitive in searching for an existential peak, and that meant “hitting the hills for two hour rides”.
Going into the 2003 Breeders’ Cup, he arrived face to face with the biggest hill on the course.
“I realized that I had to take more risks if I were ever going to win significant money at the races,” he explained. “After breakfast with my brother on Breeders’ Cup morning, we each became committed to not flinching.”
Duncliffe recognizes that the solidarity between brothers provided the moral and emotional support to “not flinch” in the face of a challenge.
“This mutual endorsement helped me to stick with it,” he explained.
Once willing to back his intellectual opinion with real money, Duncliffe (and his brother as well) went on to have one of those big days you dream of. Part of their success that day was a willingness to key horses at long odds, such as Action This Day in the Juvenile.
When the dust had settled on this big day when everything went right, Duncliffe reflected on what it had taken to get where he had arrived, and resolved to not throw it away betting on every race on every ordinary card.
He realized that to play big he had to play selectively. In reflecting and defining his approach, he also collected evidence from his own past records. He discovered that his best days came from special events in racing like Breeders’ Cup and Kentucky Derby day. He realized that such events allowed the player many days of reflection and organization of betting plans, for the past performances are available at least a week in advance for such events. There is time to be reflective.
“Time is the biggest obstacle against money management,” he explained. “Money management is equally important to handicapping, and yet in daily play we never have time to really reflect on each decision we make.”
He resolved to only bet seriously on such special events. But how often do these opportunities arise? Surely there must be more than just the BC and Triple Crown. Duncliffe adopted a wait-and-pounce attitude. When the opportunity finally did arise, many of us did not notice it. After all, how can Aqueduct winter dirt racing compare with a Brreders’ Cup?
Duncliffe scanned and hunted. In one of his forays, into the NYRA website in December 2005, he discovered that the Big A feature had paid $94. This monster payoff triggered a reaction.
“I felt that no one would have had the pick six that day,” he explained, “and there might be a huge carryover.”
He checked and his suspicion was validated. But the card of the $94 winner was on December 18 and racing did not resume at Aqueduct following the holiday vacation until December 28.
“I have ten days to reflect,” Duncliffe noted to himself. He had created his own personalized Breeders Cup, in the sense that he was provided with a considerable period of time to analyze entries and plan strategies. The best news was that the past performances would be available on December 23, a whole five days in advance. It was like receiving a Racing Form under the Christmas tree.
“I knew from my own past that my best success would come when I got information way in advance,” Duncliffe explained, and thus, the idea of a pick six investment at the Big A had time to mature in his mind.
As of December 18, Duncliffe began to use his time wisely. He studied track biases, trainer statsand other esoterica that daily play would never allow time for.
“In New York fields are often loaded with also-eligibles, and I was worried that this would destroy my advantage of having the past performances in advance. But I found that there were only two races in the pps with also-eligibles and my anxiety was gone.
“I had been confident from the very beginning, which was strange in a way since I rarely chase a pick six. It was the combination of circumstances, as I’ve explained, that made this one different.”
“Once I had the pps in my hand, the first thing I did was to look at the non-running line indicators, such as the horses’ record at Aqueduct and trainer specialties. In the feature, a statebred handicap, I discovered that there was only won horse coming from open-company, and I resolved to use that horse. [That horse went on to win.]
“I had not been well versed in the main ticket/backup ticket strategy, but with time available, I was able to study it. That’s when you stagger your tickets in a way that up to two backups can win, rather than your key horses, and you can have a winning ticket.
“But in the end, that strategy would have cost me about $150. Knowing that with this type of bet you can lose it all just because of one single bad outcome, but also knowing that I was extremely confident about the card, I decided to go with a tighter ticket, spending $96, but using what I had learned about the main-backup strategy to boost my leverage.”
C&X a sked Duncliffe about his singles. Were they 5-1 or above, as some strategists advise.
“No,” he replied. “In fact they were 5-2 and even money. The even money horse was in the last leg. He had just obliterated a field that had pretty much the same horses in it this time.”
Duncliffe drove to Suffolk to put in his bets, but it was a workday.
“I had to go back to the office. I resolved to step up my work at the office and not allow the pick six to alter my mind. In fact, you may call it superstition, because I felt the need to work even harder.”
Some time later he phoned for results and learned that he had winners in the first three legs.
“After the fifth leg winning result, I was still alive and had that even money single in the last leg. I drove back to the track to see the last race. I repeated to myself that I should keep calm.
Suffolk is only 15 minutes from my office but there was traffic and I didn’t make it on time. Walking in from the parking lot, I saw my horse’s name up there.”
The pick six paid about $14,500.
Days in advance, Duncliffe had been sending e-mails out to friends and colleagues. I happened to be on his list, and I remember wondering how the guy can feel such confidence about winter racing at Aqueduct. A huge sense of commitment and conviction oozed out from between the lines of his messages, and I told myself that if he hits this one, well there’s a real story for C&X readers.
Messages about betting psychology, player discipline and a well-conceived strategy are implicit in Duncliffe’s words and actions, as represented in this story, but for poetic and pedagogical justice we’ll also leave him with this month’s Last Word at the end of the issue.

LESSONS FROM 2005:
THE RESULTS OF A BETTING EXPERIMENT
In some ways it was a very successful year and in other ways it fell short. But it was a radical experiment and therefore worth sharing for the lessons it may contain.
My New Year’s resolution going into 2005 was to not make any pure action bets, and in fact, to eliminate all play that did not relate to tried-and-proven methods. No speculation allowed. No fun bets. No hunches.
For the most part, I kept this promise. I sinned on a couple of occasions, such as a futures bet on Kittens Joy for the Arc de Triomphe after talking to the enthusiastic owner Ken Ramsey following the horse’s comeback prep race. This bet went down the tubes after a less than perfect Arlington Million performance. Ramsey withdrew the horse was withdrawn from the Arc and I lost the bet without even going to the gate.
I also allowed myself to bet every single race on one afternoon of live racing at Saratoga, in what Dave Litfin told me was the “worst card of the meet”. This was a reward (I rationalized) for having been able to get to Saratoga in the first place. Saratoga is like a capricious lover. She’s seductive and makes you want to be lavish with her.
For the most part, though, I followed my resolution rigorously.
I have made more money in some other fiscal racing years, for sure, since in 2005 I bet much less. But the good news in 2005 was my return on investment: 68%.
Before I allowed myself to celebrate, I uncovered a depressing stat from these same record. Most of my winnings had come from my smaller bets, often pieces of larger combinations of exotics or races in which I played more than one horse to win, while the results of my larger bets failed to reflect the level of confidence I had in those bets.
In my betting life, the rules for passing races had never been so strict. If I even suspected that there was a missing piece of information that could affect my betting decision, I would pass the race. If the horse I planned on keying was going off at below fair value in the win pool, I would pass the race. If a meet was regularly producing inexplicable results, I would dump the whole meet. If a card made no sense, I’d pass the whole card and go home. Intellectually I like the idea of hedonism but in practice I was playing like a Buddhist monk.
I also had to come to terms with certain realities that intervene in one’s betting decisions. For example, if non-horseplaying friends decided to tag along to the track, I knew from my past that I am not capable of concentrating with sufficient intensity to make the right decisions, not while socializing, so I would refrain from betting on more than a race or two during these social excursions, and would only play if I could get away to a remote corner to reflect on my betting decision.
In fact, knowing from my past records that I needed the time and space to reflect, I refrained from betting at all during periods of stress, which meant no longer trying to squeeze in a trip to the OTB between one teaching gig and another. It was a question of respect for the betting process, that even a small bet should not be taken lightly. The only exception was in the category of automatic bets. I love this kind of wager because it remains stable even in times of instability.
I also lost time because of several tragedies that marched into my life, some of which required my personal attention and cut out whole weeks of betting. (The death of Dick Mitchell was an exception, since Dick would have told me to celebrate his life by walking up to the window and playing my key horse “with everything that can walk”.)
In tallying up my records, I see more than ever that the best decisions were made when I was able to remove myself from the static around me. I also see that the quality of my handicapping in my best months was no different than it was in the lesser months, and that the essential difference between the best and worst was either decision making or pure luck.
Another lesson I learned was that leverage is good when the risk is less than the potential reward. In other words, the idea of refraining from too many combinations (“because you are playing automatic losers”) is a false premise for the disciplined player. By using a few extra but well thought combinations, the player is increasing the probability of cashing the ticket for a substantial payoff.
On the next-to-last day of the year, I had the opportunity to be in a space and time when no one needed me and when nothing was nagging in my mind. I added one extra combination to my exotic bet, and that was the one that hit. If that had been a quick trip to the OTB between gigs, I never would have made the right addition to my bet.
But the opposite is true for players who key low-odds horses, who bet compulsively or who “go deep” without a disciplined reason for doing so. For them going deep is going off the deep end.
I could write a whole article about the function of memory in betting horses and deciding bets, but let it suffice that on one occasion, I remembered a trainer pattern that had occurred back in 2002 and was popping up again. No way I could take notes on all the patterns I see.
On the same morning that I remembered this profitable pattern, I forgot a loved one’s birthday, forgot about a consulting gig I had, leaving my client stranded, and forgot the water bottle I take with me on my bicycle. But I did remember what was essential.
By forgetting some things I am able to remember others. While I would not recommend forgetting an important gig and leaving your client stranded, it is proven that the mind needs to be liberated from too much clutter if it is to remember the patterns of horse racing.
Finally, there is a lesson I already knew but which was validated in poetic fashion. (Lessons for me may not be lessons for you, but I present these things as examples.) It was a day when I had certain responsilities that did not allow me to get to the OTB at the time of the race, so I put my bet in during the morning. It was a high-return exotic, historically a good bet for me, and I usually play such things without going into the straight pools.
The horse I keyed, seemingly with everything that could walk, ended up going off at 50-1. When I am present for a parimutuel occasion and see 50-1 on the board for a key horse, I never fail to play the horse in the straight pools. But I’m not good at visualizing the 3pm toteboard at 9am and did not conceive that my key would be overlooked to such an extent.
Needless to say, the 50-1 horse won the race, but the eventual place finisher was one of those horses that I figured “could not walk”.
I used to be able to take such things out on my wife, but she’s taught me to take these things in stride. My answer for withstanding the supreme frustrations of racing is the strategy that I practiced this year: only bet when you are a specialist, when you know something that others do not know, when your mind is clear and when you have time to use it, when the results of races prove that your handicapping has been alive, when your key horse is going off at worthy odds, when you have the time to do the research and the handicapping, and when you know, deep in your heart, that your bet is based on something more than a hunch.
Finally, in my case, I should learn to keep all bets around the same level, for if I try to outsmart myself or get greedy, I’ll get punished and I’ll lose the wiseguy big bets and win the lesser ones, which is precisely what happened to me.
Those are my lessons, and they may or may not be yours. But surely there is something you can learn from this 2005 annual statement. If you are showing a small loss in the return-on-investment column, what would happen if you could eliminate five bad bets from every hundred, without even changing your handicapping method. Suddenly your hit rate would go up and you’d become a profitable player. Surely you can find a way to eliminate five bad bets from every hundred you make. Somewhere in the above notes, you may discover an approach for making such eliminations.

LONGSHOT MUSING:
More on Thin Slicing
Bill Duncliffe mentioned that he had first consulted the non-running line information when digging into the pps on the horses running in the Big A pick six. Increasingly, non-running line data is becoming the key to live longshots.
C&X tries to watch the racing scene and learn lessons from races that we did not play. It’s a type of secondary record keeping that allows us to see patterns that will help us in future betting and decision making.
We can learn some lessons from two January 7 stakes races, the Gr II New Orleans Handicap at Louisiana Downs and the Gr III Hal’s Hope Handicap at Gulfstream.
At Lousiana Downs, the 2 horse, Dixie Meister, was going off at 32-1, and for good reason. The horse simply did not seem fast enough compared to several others. However, this horse was new in the barn of Steve Asmussen and had already improved a couple of notches in his first start for this hot stable.
Way back in 1990, in the now out-of-print Thoroughbred Cycles, I wrote that trainer determinism can trump the primary handicapping factors, and increasingly this is happening nowadays in the age of the super trainers. But we are conditioned to “handicap” in a certain way and it’s tough to teach old handicappers new tricks.
In the Closer Look column, DRF handicapper Jeff Taylor wrote: “Chapa [the rider] and Asmussen have ruled here this meeting and that kind of dominance could prove to be a soundly based tiebreaker in this evenly matched field.”
But the public will not accept trainer determinism as a key factor and did not see the field as evenly matched. Dixie Mesiter went off at 32-1.
He finished second after a tough trip. By now, C&X readers know from our past research that live longshots are twice as likely to finish second as first. That proportion becomes more pronounced as the odds rise and less pronouced as they descend.
The second favorite beat out Dixie Mesiter and the favorite finished third. Yet the tri paid $512.40. If you’re taking notes, the exacta as place bet paid $139. Even if we find it difficult to bet an apparently slow horse in the straight pools, surely we can include it in the exotics when trainer determinism is a hot factor.
In the Hal’s Hope at Gulfstream, there was a stronger reason for an anti-handicapper to play
a horse that seemed slower than others in the field. This was what I call a positively contentious race, as opposed to “negatively contentious”, since many of the horses in the field were win types with higher than normal win percentages and high Beyers.
It was the type of race where comprehensive handicapping could come up with various logics and where only the thin-slicer, the analyst who’s willing to elevate one or two secondary factors would come up with the key.
The one thin slice that looked sharp enough to cut through all other factors was horse for course. A horse named Network was 2-for-2 at Gulfstream, and this stat was especially enhanced in a context where no other horse in the field had ever won a race at GP.
The eventual winner at 5-1, On Thin Ice, showed two plus-100 Beyers in his last three races. However, he was coming back after a layoff and his record for Lay-1 was zero wins in three tries, all at relatively low odds. Contrast that with Network, who had a Lay-1 pattern match. In the only other May-1 comeback race in his pps, he was racing at Gulfstream after a 3-month-plus layoff. That win was in January. The seasonal pattern match emerged. This January race was following a 5-month-plus layoff.
Network finished second at 11-1, triggering all kinds of juicy exotic payoffs. The readers’ reaction to this article depends entirely on their opinion about whether it is a success or a failure to pick 32-1 and 11-1 place finishers.
Since live longshots are much more likely to finish place than win, we might as well view picking such horses as a success and then take measures to cash in on them, either in the place pool or in the exotics.
In the above two races, conventional handicapping could have picked the winners, but only a thin-slicing style of anti-handicapping could have projected the eventual place finisher.
Exotic wagering allows the eclectic player to cash in on a dynamic mix of conventional picking and unconventional angles, since most players either go one way or the other and fail to accept that two handicapping cultures can exist side by side, and that their potent mix results in generous exotic payouts.


C&X CAFE

ON TOTEBOARD TRACKING AND OTHER OBSERVATIONS:
A letter from Dennis C with a windy response.
Mark
I did the rebound method on 33 horses. Obviously too small to reach any sound conclusions. The results were a little surprising. 11 wins- 22 loses (33%). The R.O.I. was slightly over 9% after removing a $36.40 winner. A couple of things occurred to me. I feel 18% or 19% trainers are acceptable. It definitely increases the volume, as there are not too many 20% + trainers. What is your opinion ?
Also, I wanted your opinion of toteboard charting (grid) I think a blanket approach to the subject is obsurd. Every track is diffirent, as are track condition effects. To say early money, or late money is important is not accurate. The most surprising thing is big drops between minutes usually lose. Subtle money is more accurate, but difficult to detect. It is extremely difficult to read a race betting pattern.(not impossible) I think the biggest error that people make is to try to group races together for relevancy. Every race is a distinct individual pattern. There are no rules, and unfotunitely, it depends is the ever changing answer for each race. If you do not agree, that is fine. I think we learn more from other viewpoints anyway.
Thanks,
Dennis


Mark responds:
Two points.
Rebound Method
To refresh memories for older readers or introduce the concept to newer ones, the Rebound Method is based on the concept that horses that run their eyeballs out the first time back after a layoff are in for a possible bounce the next time they race. Some trainers actually hold back after the first comeback race because they believe in the bounce principle, and some of these guys follow the Ragozin sheets, as I learned from trainer interviews. So some trainers try to outsmart the bounce by giving the horse a mini-freshening following his comeback race.
But if a horse comes back within two weeks of the sharp comeback race in which he finished first or second, and if he does indeed bounce, then we have to consider him live the next time he races.
Long after I wrote about this one, I noticed that French trainers call the potential bounce race “the famous second race”.
During the past three or four years, I’ve received a number of samples from readers, some of them with glowing reports and others saying that the method doesn’t work. Currently I do not use it as a “system” but I do bet it, using trainer percentage as a filter. I also exclude turf horses trying the dirt or dirt horses with poor breeding trying the turf for the first time. In other words, I consider the research in a flexible way. The trainer filter can be frustrating since we will sometimes watch a longshot win with no money on him because the trainer had less than a 12% hit rate.
However, in the long run, the research shows that it’s better to cut out the low-percentage trainers.
Toteboard Tracking
There is no question in my mind that toteboard action can be meaningful. But when? My friend Barry Meadow did a study of many thousand races in which he proved that bet-down action was meaningless. For me the study itself was meaningless. Why?
For four reasons.
First, because he considered many favorites as betdowns when they should not have been thus considered. For example, 5-2 ML horses going off at 2-1 or 9-5 were considered as betdowns. They are not betdowns because the Morning Line favorite is always given higher odds than real value by the program odds maker so as to not discourage action on the fave.
Second, many live longshot betdowns were not considered as such in Barry’s study. For example, a horse that’s 15-1 in the ML and opens at 4-1 (“open” means after there’s enough money in the pool to make the odds meaningful). This horse is indeed a betdown. But what happens if the horse’s odds then drift up ever so slowly, as the public’s non-action is averaged into the early big bet. If this horse ends up at 16-1, I will still consider it as a betdown. Why? Because 15-1s in the ML are placed too slow by the ML maker, again in order not to discourage action, and most of them go off much higher than their initial ML odds.
Third, and most important, it was impossible for Meadow to see in his study, which used only final odds, that the key to a significant betdown is when the betdown horse or horses happen in synchronicity with non-action on the two ML faves.
In other words, the ML faves were 2-1 and 5-2. The 2-1 opens at 3-1 and the 5-2 opens at 4-1. They stay above their ML until late in the betting, when the crowd may “discover” that “hey, the ML favorite is an overlay” and then flock to the windows to bet down the horse to its ML or even slightly below.
At the same time, one longshot, 15-1 in the ML opens at 6-1 and drifts up to maybe 12-1. Another ML longshot, maybe 8-1 in the ML, opens at 7-2 and eventually drifts up to 7-1.
Here we have the dynamics where two longshots have sucked away action from two favorites. This great sucking action may have come from real insiders or may also come from enlightened sectors of the betting public. (I’ve interviewed owners of action horses, asking them, “was it you who caused that early action?” and they respond, “Yeah, that was me ... I bet early because I’m afraid that after the paddock I might get involved with people and not be able to get the bet in.”)
Fourth, the key point here is that real betting “action” is irregular and has movement on the board. It need not have taken place as early action. It could also happen midway during the betting, and still have a subsequent drift-back-up in odds. It can also happen late, especially nowadays with all the computer geeks doing odds permutations in search of the “value”.
Here’s a classic example of a non-action pattern that Meadow’s study would have picked up as action. A horse that’s 8-1 in the ML opens at 5-1 and remains at 5-1 throughout. This pattern represents a gross error of the ML maker and not a betdown. If a horse’s action is completely steady throughout, then it’s simply the betting public expressing its consensus, and proving that the ML maker misjudged this public.
These examples illustrate that no toteboard research can be done after the fact using programs and final odds. The researcher would have to be a tracker. He’s have to be there race after race. His labor-intensive salary for such agony in our times of capital-intensive research would be excessively expensive.
Any player who does decide to use tote tracking in his play must know who the local ML maker is and whether or not he really knows how to accurately judge crowd betting behavior, which is precisely the job of making the ML. If he can’t do this well, then his line is not a good yardstick to use in judging insider betdowns.

MORE ON THE TOTE: Betdown-Overlay

Mark
As a long time subscriber to C&X I am just writing to express a little disappointment - no not in the Newsletter but in the fact that I had to read about the above referenced item in the January 2006 issue of American Turf Monthly. Did I miss this item in one of the C&X issues? This was a great strategy and I have already put it to use in the 11th @ CRC on 12/18/05. I'm not sure the horse "No Badge" was a true qualifier but the analysis combined with the use of the Turf to Dirt angle (one of my favorites) led me to this winner at $18.60. One last comment - I know your intent with C&X is to make us think for ourselves but I would love to read about more about your strategies & preferably in C&X not "ATM" I have picked up a lot of good information from C&X and your book "Thoroughbred Cycles is one of my favorite reference works. I also make extensive use of your "Exacta as a Place bet" strategy. Keep up the great work. Bernie M.

Cramer responds:

Thanks Bernie for the letter. I recall several times when we’ve revisited the Betdown-Overlay in the pages of C&X. It’s been awhile, for sure. This thing originally dates back to the old C&O, but I constantly update the research.
My agreement with American Turf Monthly, is that I have a right to use things that I’ve previously published, since their audience is different than ours. In other words, you should always get it first in C&X. Not only that but in C&X I have more space and freedom to get into subtleties and variations, since no one can order me to keep it under X number of words. In all honesty, the ATM gig allows me to get publicity for C&X in an era when print media publication of any type is not a money maker. But it is fun.
In any case, just to remind the readers, the Betdown Overlay refers to a horse that was out of the money in its last start and more than four lengths behind, but that’s dropping in odds today compared to its last race. He ran a lousy race and yet he’s getting action today.
The ATM piece concentrates on the lower end of the odds spectrum and requires five lengths behind and no better than fifth in its last race but the horse is a betting favorite today. The uniqueness of the betdown overlay is that you don’t need to track odds to identify the betdown since the betdown refers to today’s odds relative to the odds in the horse’s previous race. It makes sense. The horse looked bad in his last race, and yet his odds are lower today than they were in that previous race.
Isn’t that what this game is about? Finding horses that look bad in the pps, but that are bettable for any number of crazy reasons.

Hi Mark:I have been a c&x reader for a number of years. I think I am a good handicapper but have a real problem with my betting. I usually zig when I should zag. For example I find a horse that I like and if I bet him to win it will finish second and I miss out on a great exacta. If I bet it in an exotic wager it will win and the horses I need in second or third will not be there and I lose. Most of my friends who are handicappers have this problem to some degree. I think this would be a great topic to expound on in c&x.As part of a solution to this problem keeping better records I am sure would help. Everyone writes about the importance of record keeping but I have never seen a step by step "how to". Maybe it is too simple but I think it would be worth exploring to get different ideas on what type of information people track and how they do it so it is not overwhelming in time and effort. I would love to see examples of what your record keeping looks.As a brief response to your question of where I do my best handicapping at the track or somewhere else, I feel I do the best at home. At home I do not have the distractions that I do at the track. When I am at the track I am usually with a number of people and it is a social situation and everone has an opinion and is playing a different track. This can be a distraction. At home it is just me and if I do not like a race I can do somethin else. At the track there is more pressure to play a race.Hope you may find these issues interesting and worth looking into. Thank you.John Corey

Cramer responds :
On Zigging and Zagging
Good question on record keeping as it relates to decision making. First of all, part of your question is answered in the lead article on my records from 2005, and in fact, your letter triggered that article. Please notice that a part of my betting involves automatic bets, which allows for less of a possibility for messing up. And yet, even with automatic bets, I sometimes find a way to stand up before the finish line.
In part, my rigorous avoidance of any type of situation that I would consider speculative is not the best solution for all players. Players who can successful think on their feet, quickly and intensely, day in and day out, even when viewing several monitors at the same time, are invited to bypass the rigorous approach I wrote about in the lead article. You will make more money than I will.
I would suggest that John’s zigging when he should zag could result from three possible problems or some combination of the three.
They are: Poor Record Keeping, Bankroll Constraints and Multi-Tasking.
Poor record keeping. I won’t repeat the lead article except to reiterate that the purpose of records is the scientific method. My son tells me that “trial and error” is part of the scientific method. You record the “why” of all your decisions, and then you read back the totality of the whys and discover where you are strong and where you are weak. Then, you take action accordingly. If you never hit an exotic in cheap claimers but you’ve picked winners at good prices, then stick to the straight pools. If you’re great at picking longshots to place and show then you’d better get involved in exactas and tris. What players can learn from their records is as big a subject as handicapping itself. I can’t go any deeper here because the rest is personal with each one of you. That’s why I have a standing offer that you can mail me a copy of your recorded betting decisions, and I will happily comment on how I believe you can improveyour bottom line.
Bankroll constraints. Normally, an overlay horse is eligible to be played in every pool. The player has to consider win, place, and even show, together with exactas, trifectas, and supers, and still then we have the serial bets, including pick threes and pick fours. If that’s not enough, at some tracks you can make your own parlays (not a bad idea because you get to choose your best races. I loved the old Las Vegas round robin.) If every pool is eligible for play, then you have lots of decisions to make. If at any moment you begin to think, “well, I only have so much cash, which pool should I choose?” you are already eligible to zig when you should zag. It’s the financial constraint that forces you to lose your leverage.
If you do not have a sizable bankroll that is completely separate from the rent, gas and grocery money, then you are put in a position where you have to make hard choices that are almost arbitrary. The likelihood is that you will make the wrong choices, but in fact, they are not choices, they are constraints, and you are a prisoner to these constraints.
The only way out is to know which pools have been successful for you and stick with them, and most important, stay clear of pools that have proven themselves to be money eaters. I’ve been getting letters from players with bad stories and good ones. The good ones usually turn out to be when the player has decided to specialize in one pool or two pools, even when they do have a large bankroll.
Multi-Tasking
C&X has given numerous examples. Under the same roof, Susan Sweeney specializes in tris, pick threes and pick fours, for she has found her niche in these pools. And yet, her husband Ed Bain specializes in straight win bets. A follower of the Bain trainer method, also a C&X reader, has done well specializing in playing longshots to place. That sure is a niche! Not too many professionals are in the place pool.
If a player knows where he or she does the best, then why shouldn’t he settle into that pool and specialize. If a player is a natural multi-tasker (able to think about and do many things at the same time, then by all means leave all pools open in case they contain overlays).
I am not a natural multi-tasker but the lifestyle I have chosen (multiple careers, living and betting in different countries) has forced me into being a multi-tasker.
In summary, my suggestion to John is to find the right structure for each type of handicapping situation. The type of situation (content) determines the type of bet (form). And just so you’re not so down on yourself, I confess to having the talent for committing decision making errors even in situations where it’s supposed to be an automatic bet!

THE BIG WIN: DECISION MAKING WORKSHOP
Let’s look at the LaBrea Stakes, run at Santa Anita on December 31 in order to confront the complexities of decision making, even when we have an automatic bet. The automatic bet in question is The Big Win. When a horse wins by 5 or more lengths, bet him back the next time. Such horses usually face stiffer competition so the odds don’t plummet. The margin of victory says that they outclassed their rivals so much that they should handle the rise in class. We are assured that such horses are in peak form.
Exclude horses coming from maiden claiming fields, where, because of the category of the field, it’s easier to win by daylight without being hot stuff. Exclude wet track wins because the field usually ends up strung out with daylight between ‘em all, since so many horses can’t handle the going. And exclude the big win if the horse is coming back after a layoff for a trainer who doesn’t thrive on comeback horses.
C&X has received mixed reviews on the Big Win method. We’ve received some independent samples that validate our own findings only to open the mailbox the next day and find a sample with a negative return on investment. If we had a way of simply identifying a poor field, then we could exclude Big Win qualifiers who come from poor fields. I’m toying with the idea of excluding horses that did not run faster than par for their big win.
In the La Brea Stakes, with 11 horses, there were three Big Win qualifiers. Normally in cases of an automatic bet, one bets to win. Period. No matter how many horses. The research was in the win hole, and that’s our positive expectation.
But we get greedy and maybe two Big Win horses finish one-two in an exacta and we look at that event subjectively or anecdotally and we say, ok, let’s play exactas as well as win bets. In the La Brea Stakes, if we had decided to box the three Big Win horses in the exacta, we’d have had to increase the win bet amount, especially since the win hole will leave us with two automatic losers.
One possibility is to play the horse or horses with the higher odds. If you have a 2-1, a 6-1 and a 14-1, play the highest two in the win hole and then, as a back up, maybe play them under the 2-1 in the exactas.
The opposite approach would be to dutch all three, putting a lot on the 2-1 a medium amount on the 6-1 and less on the 14-1. I don’t like this solution because if the 14-1 wins, I’d feel as if I lost, even if I collect.
In any case, such a decision was not necessary in the La Brea Stakes. TRICKLE OF GOLD was going off at 5-1, MY MISS STORM CAT at 5-1 and PUSSYCAT DOLL at 6-1. Now, say we bet all three to win; if we collect at 5-1 it means we really got only even money. Six bucks gets you a return of twelve.
So we consider injecting handicapping into the formula, a very risky procedure when considering that an automatic bet is precisely named so because it is better than handicapping. Injecting handicapping into an automatic bet means the possibility of skimming away the highest returning horses, because those are the ones that look the poorest in the pps. The whole purpose of automatic bets is that they can pick horses that do not look like hot stuff in the pps compared to the rest of the field.
I had recently dealt with such a dilemma, having two automatic bets in the same race, one that figured at good odds and the other a longer shot that looked bad. I bet three units on the look-good pp horse and only one unit on the longer and apparently less talented horse. The longer-odds horse won. Needless to say, the joy of victory was dented and dimmed.
So in the case of the La Brea Stakes, even though everything from a handicapping point of view seemed to point to PUSSYCAT DOLL, I zagged back to my non-interventionist philosophy.
Let’s look at the reasons why PUSSYCAT DOLL looked better than the other two. First, she was coming back after a moderate layoff and was already two for two following layoffs, having won by 4 and by 3 in those two Lay-1 races. Secondly, we were on a sloppy track (wet-fast since it was sealed) and PUSSYCAT DOLL was one of only two horses in the field that had won over Santa Anita’s unique sealed slop. The other was Sharp Lisa, but her sloppy win was at a meager 3/5 so she probably had not beaten much. There was a third “reason” for liking PUSSYCAT DOLL. She won while racing 4 wide in her sloppy track SA victory and now she was parked on the far outside.
This was good stuff. Two usual negatives, the layoff and the outside post, turned into positive factors with this filly.
TRICKLE OF GOLD was an East Coast horse shipping in from much cheaper fields at lesser tracks. Her wins were on the front end with relatively slow fractions, and now she would face West Coast speed. A slow paced wire to wire win diminishes the significance of the margin of victory.
MY MISS STORM CAT was racing above her conditions. She’d won a nw1 allowance while PUSSYCAT DOLL had won two stakes races.
Fresh from the situation where I had allowed handicapping to interfere with an automatic bet, I went the other way with this one and called for an equal bet on each of the three.
In other words, John, I zigged when I should have zagged. So don’t feel so bad. We all do it.
The real question
But the real question is: what’s the right thing to do all the time, zig or zag. Herein lies the solution. I would venture to say that in matters of the automatic bet, my mistake was not in the La Brea Stakes but in the Deauville race. With an automatic bet, injecting handicapping is the wrong thing to do.
Unless
Unless you have decided to use the Big Win research not as an automatic bet but rather, as a handicapping tool. In that case, a bet on PUSSYCAT DOLL could have been the logical choice, especially since you were getting an extra point in the odds.
She paid $15.40. If you got greedy and played the exacta, you’d have lessened your profit. The other two were off the board. But that’s another zig-or-zag choice, isn’t it?
This is a remarkably complex game, even after one’s handicapping is finished. For those of you who would really like to make a fresh and new decision on each race rather than following a structure, I would suggest the 20/80 rule. Spend 20 percent of your time on the handicapping and 80 percent on the decision making.

THE FINAL WORD
From Bill Duncliffe
PICKING YOUR SPOTS
I’ve been guilty in the past of playing every race on a card. How often after a day of betting is done, have I said to myself, “I had two good feelings for the day. If I’d only put most of my money on those two races instead of spreading it out over races where I had no special feeling.
Where you have a potential advantage, that’s where you have to go with it.
And that means spending an equal amount of time on handicapping and money management. Lack of time is the enemy of success. That’s why my best opportunities are found when you know the events you are playing days in advance. Then the time factor will no longer be an obstacle against money management and background research.
Once you have mastered the path of picking your best spots, then you gotta take more risk. It’s essentially an individual decision, but moral and emotional support from a respected friend, colleague or family member can strengthen resolve.
But such resolve will be of little use if you have not picked your spot.