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Mark Cramer's C & X Report for the HandicappingEdge.Com.

Monday, April 04, 2005

C&X #19 follows. Again, even though we work on the formatting every time Mark sends an issue to us, there is something that simply does not translate and thus some of the text is a bit skewed. Still it's readable, and the hard copies should be in the mail by the 10th or 11th. Dave


CONTENTS
Too Much Information
C&X Cafe: ?Yo Racing Fans?, from Dr. Billy M.
Trainer Research, from Jon Wright
Stat: Beyer Figs and Prep Spacing of Recent Derby Winners
Exactas and Second-Place Line Making, from Keith
Running it into the Ground: by Bill Handleman
Another View on Millshakes: by Steve Zacks
Quest Star and the Quest for Profits
The Last Word: by Nick Kling

TOO MUCH INFORMATION:
WHAT?S IMPORTANT, WHAT?S NOT?
Why is it that when we?re winning, we?re such good handicappers and when we?re losing, we?re so bad? How can we know so much, and yet, at times, seem to be so confused?
The inherent complexity of racing information, with its layered and wobbly variables, seems to demand that we find some hierarchy of values, some way to latch on to what?s most important and to weed out what will make little difference.
But then, a seemingly insignificant variable affects the entire outcome of a race. One horse that should have been in a pace duel gets off slowly, and the race becomes a runaway affair. Another horse that should have gone wide in starting a mile at Santa Anita from the outside, somehow gets to the rail on the first turn when the other horses inside of him create an early-race configuration that allows the outsider to become an insider.
So much is unpredicatable that mathematicians have declared that some complex systems are computationally irreductible.
Horseplayers have gotta love that phrase! This is the theme of an exciting article in the 26 February issue of The New Scientist, entitled ?Too Much Information.? The author, Mark Buchanan, makes no mention of horse race handicapping, but in this article about prediction, he does refer to another form of gambling, albeit less complex than racing: the stock market. The paradigms of prediction in complex scenarios have certain universal truths, and horse race handicapping applies rather strikingly to most everything that Buchanan refers to.
The author first sets us up for a gloomy conclusion, but by the fifth paragraph he seduces us with an optimistic surprise: ?even computationally irreductible systems can be more predictable than anyone thought.?
With today?s past performances bulging with information, the game has become one of information management, filtering and synthesis more than information discovery. Sure, sometimes everything is right there in the pps, and that should lower the average mutuel, but in fact, we still have the same chance to find an overlay, only in different ways. That?s why it concerns us to learn about the discovery about how to deal with too-much-information situations.
The breakthrough came through research into computer programs called ?cellular automata?. There are 256 different rules for each row of cells, called a cellular automaton. Whether the cells turn black or white depends on the behavior of cells in other parts of the system, sort of like saying that early position of the horse who left post 8 may somehow become afffected by the behavior of the horse on the rail, depending on the reactions of the six horses in between.
Now here is where it really gets interesting. Just imagine that the 256 automata rules were 256 interrelated handicapping rules. In exhaustive studies by mathematicians, it has been concluded that sometimes the system would fall into a static or periodically repeating pattern (simplicity), while many other times, the 256 rules generated highly complex and seemingly random patterns (complexity or chaos).
When these conclusions were being arrived at, I was writing in the late 1980s, in The Odds On Your Side, that to analyze a race, we first had to decide whether it was a rational race (I mentioned various categories of rational races) or a chaos race, and based on that decision, our handicapping would change. What I was missing was the non-linear interaction of factors.
Since this computer system is mimicking physical processes, influences can pass from one point to neighboring points, and this complex interaction can be at least partially understood.
This type of question arrived at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (where I happened to have studied, thanks to the City of New Orleans train that got me there from Chicago). Physicist Nigel Goldenfield studies pattern formation in various types of structures, from snowflakes to limestone deposits. He reached the conclusion that the best way to study patterns is through what he calls ?coarse-grained models?. These models leave out most of the details, focusing on the generalized description of the process that forms the pattern.
This physicist and his colleagues have decided that completely different scenarios can have precisely the same logic. This reminds me of certain controversies within handicapping circles, when people like Howard Sartin (pace) and Ed Bain (trainer) have been criticized for not handicapping ?comprehensively?, for having left out most factors in their information patterns. From what we have seen, thus far, in the Buchanan article, Sartin and Bain were using coarse-grain models, and therefore finding repeatable patterns even though the races they were using probably had dynamics different from each other.
Strangely, Bain would today say that pace (Sartin?s factor) is irrelevant in trainer-specialty handicapping, while Sartin was known for belittling the trainer handicappers, declaring that ?the trainer can?t talk to the horse?. But were attacked for having simplified the complex.
But it seems that, as different as they may be from each other, both Bain and Sartin have been applying a type of coarse grain logic that allows them to greatly simplify complex systems.
Or as Mark Buchanan states: ?...some cellular automata might actually be simpler than they appeared ? even those thought to be computationally irreductible. Perhaps you just had to know which details to ignore and then adopt the appropriate ?coarse-grained? perspective.
In other words, much of our handicapping relies on choosing which factors to ignore. Bain has tenaciously ignored the speed factor for years now. Sartin ignored the trainer.
Physicists pursuing this logic eventually found a way to make chaos scenarios roughly predicatable, and from the cellular automata, we learn that in 240 of the 256 cases, coarse-grained logic held its own, failing only in 16 cases.
Now my friends, if we could only identify those 16 cases, we would know for sure when to use the ALL. Otherwise, we would do well to single out one or two dominant factors, depending on the race. I feel vindicated for so long having argued that the best handicapping involves wading through complexity and then settling firmly upon simplicity.
It?s too late now, but I kinda wish I had studied physics, since, back in the 1980s, I was already groping in the direction of the cellular automata research. My process had three stages:
Simplistic ... before you got into complexity;
Complexity ... which required years of study of races;
and then ... bingo: SIMPLICITY.
No my friends, it?s not that I should have studied physics. It?s that physicists should have studied horse race handicapping. I suspect that they would have advanced considerably faster with their cellular automata if they gone to the track every day, and bet each race for a whole Saratoga meet.
By April 10, 2004, Oxford physicist Neil Johnson wrote of how to apply a coarse-grained model to real financial markets, in New Scientist.
It was then that physicist Jim Crutchfield developed a scheme that could predict links between the past and the future for virtually any system. Now here, we?d have to change the language and say: ?for virtually any category of horse race?. He did so by advising that one should map past histories of events onto possible future outcomes. Note that the word ?histories? is in the plural. Any given event could have various histories. Essentially, Crutchfield was doing what we do with horse race handicapping. It was then that the coarse-grain model was developed by other physicists, which led Crutchfield to conclude that ?there is a kind of order in the chaos?.
I wish I could find the Barry Meadow article that warned us that it would be impossible to reduce handicapping to one or two factors, for with the coarse-grain theory, I could respond that, to the contrary, it is precisely necessary to reduce things to one or two factors ... most of the time ... and to be able to identify those few times when such reduction is impossible. Buchanan writes that in this knowledge process, ?less is sometimes more?, and writes about trying ?to strip irrelevant details away?.
He refers to the laws of thermodynamics, explaining that physicists could not have ever developed objective measures of thermodynamics, fluid dynamics and chemistry without ignoring vast amounts of molecular detail.
I am reminded of the debate at the last Handicapping Expo, when the Thoroughgraph spokesman was criticizing the Ragozin people for refusing to include the wind factor in devising their figures. In turn, Beyer said that Ragozin was wasting his time factoring how many lanes wide a horse raced on the turns into speed figures.
Both wind and turn position were considered by the critics as too detailed and at the same time, too unreliable. Different horses are affected differently by being wide. Some hate the rail. Sometimes the middle of the track is faster than the inside. Some horses like Rock Hard Ten thrive from the outside. Good figures might be better if they did not try to find precision where precision cannot possibly exist.
The apparent legitimacy of coarse-grain logic makes me think that we have new frontiers to cross in the realm of both pp research and everyday handicapping.
Given that both Bain and Sartin have been successful with their own coarse-grain models (not simplistic models), it seems to me that we could take it many steps beyond if we could come up with a method of previewing races that would allow us to know to what extent of coarseness would be acceptable for a given race. One of the race categories in The Odds On Your Side could be a good starting point.
It was called ?the Single Factor Race?. The single factor could be things like pace, horse-for-course, trainer specialty, pedigree, etc. The handicapping task is to discern when a single factor rises above the rest to dominate. When this happens, we can be sure that coarse-grained model will eclipse more complex models. More to come on this subject, for it is essential to our success.

C&X CAFE

Yo Racing Fans,

I have subscribed to C & X since day one and have learned, more than anything else, to read as much as possible and make my own decisions.? As I don't have time to do a lot of independent research, I rely on the drf and brisnet websites, and of course, C & X.
So when I saw Rock Hard Ten in the Big Cap at Santa Anita, I recalled Mark's prognostication that this could be a great horse.? I reread C & X 16 and also noted that RHT liked the outside where he could stay out of trouble.? He had post 10, just inside the even money favorite Saint Liam.? I couldn't belive RHT was 7/2 - a huge overlay.
I sent it in and after the win wrote to Mark that my winnings on that single wager would allow me to be a lifetime subscriber to C & X - not that I wouldn't have anyway!
Cheers, Mark, and take some credit once in a while!

Dr. Billy M.

Cramer responds:
Doc,
I am truly honored to have played a role in your big score, but I would also like to note that you made the decision on your own, and used value in deciding the worthiness of the bet. I doubt you?d have taken even money on RHT.
The great joy I have in this score of yours is not from having touted a horse, but from having relayed a piece of useful information as well as providing (in the long term) a way of judging the value of such information. This is what C&X is all about.
PS. RHT has come upon some physical problems since his win.


TRAINER RESEARCH
by Jon Wright
[C&X thanks Jon Wright for sharing his brilliant research. This is not the first time that a C&X reader comes forward with elegant research. Some of the best handicapping minds in the world happen to be subscribing to this publication. Wouldn?t it be fun to gather these minds one day try a pick 6 together!]

Hi Mark,

I just read your online version of C&X #18.?? Well, "read" is extreme ? I have had just time to glance at it, but will as always read it thoroughly as soon as possible.? However, one thing did catch my attention - and that is what you had to say about 5% trainers.? Your comment was that (in general), 5% trainers will win about 5% of the time.? Certainly makes sense.? I would
suspect that you would also state that generally, 3% trainers will win 3% of the time in the long run, 9%/12%/15% etc. will, in the long run, win at their established level.

I have run some studies on trainers who have established various winning percentages, and have found that there seems to be a gravitation towards a "middle ground" - terrible trainers (below 10% over a year's period) tend to hit ABOVE their printed winning percentage and excellent trainers tend to hit below their printed percentage.? The gravitation seems to be pulling both groups towards the 12% overall that all would be at if all had an equal chance in each race (presuming about 8 horses in a field).

I am not saying that top trainers will not remain "top" trainers, nor that the bottom level trainers will not remain at the bottom - but that very few are able to overcome some randomness in racing.? When restricting my group to trainers to those that have won below 10%, they tend to hit very slightly above their established level.? When restricting my group to trainers who have won at 20%+, they tend to hit below that established level.

I use Ed Bain's statistics as my primary source of betting information.? As you know, he bets trainers who have won at least 30% of the time with 4 wins or more in specific layoff/claim/debut situations.? The overall hit rate on the entire group of trainers who achieve this level winds up being between 19% and 22% in any given month.? Ed believes that the less-than 30% hit rate for these trainers can generally explained by the fact that there are races
where multiple 4+30s face each other, thus guaranteeing a loss for one or more.? I have found that is not the case, as in races where 2 "4+30" trainers face each other, one or the other wins about 40% of the time (so the two average a 20% hit rate).? When 3 4+30 trainers face each other, one of them will win about 60% of the time.? So, it is not that facing each other pulls their hit rates down, it is that someone is winning "too often" - something caused by either a spectacular run of having the best horse or of having the best luck.? That is why there are zero trainers who have won 50% of the time on any of Ed's categories in 100 tries and more.
(If there is one, I have not discovered it.)? There are a handful of trainers who hit 50% in 40 or 50 tries, but by the time they get to 100 tries, the win percentage will be around 30-40%.

... I know I have gotten off-track here, but I would postulate that there is a central tendency towards the average - poor trainers will always be poor, but they can't be as bad as they seem and stay in the game.? Great trainers can stay "super-great" for only so long, their record must come down to a human level.? Bill Mott has hit a period of being just "great", not super-human as his overall win percentage is around 19%-20% rather than 24%-25%.? Lake has become a 22%-23% trainer rather than a 30% trainer.? They are both terrific, but if you expect them to stay at the super-human levels for the length of their careers - you will be disappointed.

Generally speaking, at the lowest win percentages, a trainer will experience a further experience of winning about 2 points above his printed/established level.? (In my sample, 0% trainers won at 6%, 1% at 8%, 2% at 4%, 3% at 5%, 4% at 6%, 5% at 6%, 6% at 7%, 7% at 7%, 8% at 8%, 9% at 9%. 10% at 11%, 11% at 10%, 12% at 12%)? The size of my samples were generally above 2000, except for the 1% group (153) and 2% group (985).? Most contained over 4000.
From these examples, it appears that the level of "maximum incompetence" is about 4% or 5% - with trainers below that hitting 2% to 5% above their established level at the lowest levels.? Magic seems to occur around 8% to 12%, where those trainers generally continue to hit at their established levels.
Above 12%, trainers tend to hit below their established level - the higher their printed win percentage the lower in relation to that win percentage they actually continue to hit at (poor English, sorry about that.)

Here are 3 more groups - trainers who have a 365 day win percentage of 20% - they won 16% of their races, those at 25% hit 20% and those at 30% hit 24% (samples - 3239, 926 and 425).? So, the rich seem to stay rich and the poor remain poor - but neither at the level that you would presume from their year-long averages as printed on race day.

I'm not sure what the point of all of this really is, other than one should expect the absurd to happen at times - just slightly more often than one thinks is reasonable.? Sometimes, a 2% trainer wins when going up against a 30% trainer - and just slightly more often than your would expect.? (I do have some terrific examples of occasions when this is more likely to occur - particularly when a terrible trainer owns his/her horse and has a slight indication/hint that they are doing something within their competence ? but I will save that for another time.? Susan has inspired me to look for some oddities that I would not have otherwise considered.)

Thanks for keeping kinky handicapping talk alive.? Your newsletter along with Ed's and Susan's are my favorite reading year round.? They always give me new avenues to explore.

Take care,

Jon Wright

P.S.? Hope this did not seem like a "nitpick" - as terrible trainers clearly do terribly.? I stumbled onto this sometime ago, wanted to mention it but never found the right conversation to drop it into.? I just decided to put it out there since you happened to touch on the subject (a little) in issue #18.

Hi Mark,

I always seem to think of "just one last thing", like Columbo, after seeming to finish with something.? I did want to comment that I have a theory that a trainer has a maximum competency of about 35% (in very rare cases, 40%) in his/her specialties.? In deciding on an odds level that I can accept on an entry, I never accept anything above a 40% expectation that an entry will win based on a trainer's layoff/claim/debut statistic.? Scott Lake got started at Aqueduct by hitting 7 of his first 10 in 1st after a claim in sprints - then leveled off and is now around 30%.? There are countless other examples - and there are runs where a trainer will go on a terrific streak within his specialty - but even the best will level off at around 35% as a
maximum in the long run.

Of course, I could be wrong,

Jon

Mark responds:
Without getting hung up on Columbo, a very popular re-run character in France, it makes sense that some of his greatest discoveries resulted when he was on his way out and came back for a last question. In my own handicapping, my returning for a last look after having thought I was finished has often uncovered the winning link. We should not allow ourselves to lock down our brains and assume that we have unlocked the whole truth.

KENTUCKY DERBY STAT:
THE TWO BEYER FIGS THAT LED TO THE WINNING DERBY ...
AND WEEKS BETWEEN PREP RACES AND DERBY VICTORY

Smarty Jones:? 108 (6 wks), 107 (3 wks), (107)
Funny Cide:? 99 (8 wks), 110 (3 wks), (109)
War Emblem:? 98 (7 wks), 112 (4 wks), (114)
Monarchos:? 105 (8 wks), 103 (3 wks), (116)
Fusaichi Pegasus:? 106 (7 wks), 111 (3 wks), (108)
Charismatic:? 94 (4 wks), 108 (2 wks), (108)
Real Quiet:? 108 (7 wks), 107 (4 wks), (107)
Silver Charm:? 102 (7 wks), 110 (4 wks), (115)?
Grindstone:? 102 (7 wks), 100 (3 wks), (112)

Given that this year?s Kentucky Derby crop is richly undefined at this stage, it may help us if we isolate what should happen in the two races leading up to the Derby.
With the exception of Charismatic, there was a reasonable separation between the second-to-last prep and the final prep. Every Derby winner earned at least a 100 Beyer. No Derby winner declined more than 2 Beyer points between second-to-last prep and last prep leading into the Derby. On the other hand, five of the nine Derby winners listed made a considerable improvement from the second-to-last prep and the final prep.
The weeks-before stat reflects which prep races have been the most productive. The 4-week layoff, in the case of Real Quiet and Silver Charm reminds us of the glory days when the Santa Anita Derby was a most meaningful prep.
Increasingly, California trainers have been bypassing the SA Derby in favor of the eastern prep races that come 3 weeks prior to the Derby. (The Florida Derby was moved a week closer to the Kentucky Derby in order to attract more serious customers. However, that means that a Fla Derby horse would have to go into the Kentucky Derby off a 5-week layoff, or squeeze another prep between.)
Blues and Royals
This information would be interesting in itself, but it also provides a context for evaluating the contention of Godolphin?s Blues and Royals, who produced a 110 Beyer in the UAE Derby, six weeks before the first Saturday in May. That would make him good enough to win the Kentucky Derby.
But since 1999, Sheikh al Maktoum?s Godolphin stable has been trying and failing to win a Kentucky Derby. The UAE Derby was Blues and Royals? first race as a three-year-old, while all the above Derby winners had at least three races as 3s. Looking at the above stats, it would seem in the interest of B & R to race in a prep three or two weeks prior to the Derby. But the stable has indicated that this was it: his only prep. As long as I remember the Kentucky Derby; no horse has won the big race off a single prep.
Previously a failure on the grass, Blues and Royals was bred mainly for the dirt. His poor grass form as a two-year-old deceived the betting public in the USA, allowing him to get off at huge odds, primarily because all the buzz was about the other Godolphin horse.
If the American contenders continue to bow out with injuries or decline in form, we could be left with a great dilemma: what to do about Blues and Royals. How can Godolphin stables and trainer Saeed Bin Suroor be so good with horses, so dominating on five continents and yet so unaware about what it takes to win a Kentucky Derby? Coming off a layoff, he won by 12 in the UAE Derby and the field looked no worse than that of the Florida Derby. So maybe that?s what he wants: another layoff. He won as a first-time starter (ran fresh), was second by a neck when coming back in five weeks, and then was last in a field of four when coming back in 3 weeks. Those were all grass races. Then he won the UAE Derby coming back after a 7-month layoff. So what would you do? Give him another prep, as Beyer wrote and as Derby history recommends, or let him race fresh?
Beyer was highly critical of the Sheikh?s strategy and it reminded me of an article back in 1989 by the NY Times racing columnist that called the French arrogant for expecting a mediocre turf horse, Le Voyageur, to run well in the Belmont stakes. That made me like the horse. He finished third in the trifecta, behind Easy Goer and Sunday Silence, and nearly held the place.
So, even given Godolphin?s previous Derby failures, I would be respectful enough to avoid any insinuation of arrogance. Can this classy stable buck an age-old trend in the Kentucky Derby? We have a few weeks to think about it. One indicator would be the performance of the second- and third-place finishers of the UAE Derby, Marenostrum and Parole Board, who was 7 lengths better than the rest.

RESEARCH:
EXACTAS AND SECOND-PLACE LINEMAKING
from Keith

2nd place finishes and the various bets that involve them

I'm writing to tell you about the latest phase of my exacta and 2nd place linemaking project.
The latest stats that I've generated come from my survey of all 04 Belmont races, about 900 races. What I did was to group the horses by odds groups and compare the win and place mutuels, relating them to the odds. This sort of thing has been done before, but my goal is a little different. I wanted to come up with logical 2nd place percentages to go along with the standard Win probability numbers we all use.
The first bit of logic I used was to look for horses that won a certain percentage, which is known to correspond to an odds level one notch lower. For example, horses that win 50% also tend to have 50% of the money in the win pool bet on them. They go off at odds of 3-5, due to
the effect of the takeout. Quirin and others have shown this, and my survey shows the same tendency. I looked at how often 50% horses finished second. That amount is about 20%. I looked at each level. I took moving averages of the list to smooth it out a bit. I also looked
at the average mutuels to place, relating it with the odds as a means of checking. Here are the percentages I came up with:

Win?? 2nd? Plc

.833? ? .110? ? .943
.714? ? .140? ? .854
.667? ? .155? ? .822
.625? ? .160? ? .785
.556? ? .190? ? .746
.500? ? .200? ? .700
.455? ? .210? ? .665
.417? ? .220? ? .637
.400? ? .220? ? .620
.385? ? .230? ? .615
.357? ? .230? ? .587
.333? ? .230? ? .563
.286? ? .240? ? .526
.250? ? .230? ? .480
.222? ? .210? ? .432
.200? ? .190? ? .390
.182? ? .175? ? .357
.167? ? .160? ? .327
.143? ? .150? ? .293
.125? ? .140? ? .265
.111? ? .130? ? .241
.100? ? .120? ? .220
.091? ? .111? ? .202
.083? ? .105? ? .188
.077? ? .100? ? .177
.071? ? .094? ? .165
.063? ? .090? ? .153
.056? ? .085? ? .141
.048? ? .080? ? .128
.038? ? .070? ? .108
.032? ? .050? ? .082
.020? ? .030? ? .050

It's interesting that the highest percentage you can finish 2nd is in the 5-2 (.28) bracket. Another fascinating thing is that 2nd place percentages between 4-1 and 4-5 hardly change. As PW increases, P2nd stays the same and eventually decreases, resulting in place mutuels
that stay in a tight range.? This tendency corroborates almost perfectly what I found last year in my exacta survey, using a totally different group of races.

Also interesting is that the chance of 2nd (P2nd) drops off considerably as the odds grow very low, below 1-1. This information pinpoints what is wrong with most exacta formulas written in value handicapping books, which assume that probability of 2nd equals PW, even for low odds horses. To truly explain why the formulas are wrong requires an involved discussion, with formulas. The decreasing P2nd is the central problem, however.

These 2nd place percent numbers are very useful. I can use these as probabilities for 2nd in a line, if I have no better opinion of the horse's chance for 2nd. With my W estimate and this "natural" P2nd, I can compare the fair place mutuel, in my estimate, with the likely payout. I use a handheld computer for this. You have to enter the pool totals at the track. The computer tells you the likely mutuel if the favorite runs in with your selection, or not, and calculates if you have an edge to place in both cases.

The place pool can also give you a clue which horse will be underbet for 2nd in the exacta pool. Using the natural line for 2nd, or adjusting it for my opinion, I can use one of my formulas for the exacta and compare it with the probables. I haven't worked on that
handheld program lately, because I need a more powerful computer.

Some other interesting things I found had to do with the place mutuels compared with the win mutuels. There seems to be some evidence of myth concerning the place bet being unprofitable at high odds. I found at low and high odds, the total loss (ROI) is smaller to place. In the middle odds range of 2-1 to 7-1, there seems to be some advantage to win betting. The loss to win is smaller than the loss to place.
In the high odds groups, it's true that the place payoff is disproportionately small compared to the win payoff. But horses in high brackets finish 2nd far more. They tend toward 2:1 2nds to Wins in some brackets. This ratio is what makes the place bet deliver more return, despite the poor payout compared to the win odds.

This is not to say that one shouldn't try to bet to Win with higher odds. The point is, that one shouldn't shun the place bet, because the chance of hitting outweighs the disadvantage of the poor odds.

The tendency in both win and place pools, is for the lowest odds to show the smallest loss. As the odds brackets move from low to mid to high, the loss increases. This works out if you calculate it by mutuel return on investment, or edge. In calculating edge I am comparing the
payoff to the win percentages in each odds group, and comparing the odds derived from the place mutuel to the place percentages.

In such a study, when you compare the two pools and discover that one has a smaller loss, that does not mean it's a winning strategy to play in that pool. It means that it will take less handicapping skill and effort to turn that small loss into a profitable edge, if you
concentrate on the favorable pool.

I'd like to hear your comments. I can send you more details of the study if you are interested. If you can use these 2nd place P or place P numbers in your own lines, I'd like to hear your results.

ANOTHER VIEW ON MILKSHAKES (FROM A FORMER TRAINER AND DRF WRITER)
by Steve Zacks
Just a few thoughts on your milkshake/steroid editorial, which was bang on. Some guys really are not dishonest, have no� intent to cash a bet or mislead the public � they simply want to help a horse do something better or to improve.
I trained because I loved animals in general and horses and horse-racing. While I may have lacked a long background of working with horses, I may have had a different� understanding the game from what I was able to learn on the other side of the grandstand.
When the Ontario Jockey Club raced at Greenwood in the late �80s �a 6 & ? furlong bull ring- the shortest races were two turns at that distance.
I had a sprinter, who due to conformation and soundness only wanted 6f. I gave him the then version of a milkshake � no other additives, to try to help him stretch out to the two turns and longer distance. Hopefully less lactic acid in the system might allow him to get the extra distance and turn.
I also spent 3 hours a day with him in his stall with a heavy-duty massage vibrator working on his muscles and legs. The late Danny Beckon loved to ride this animal because �and this was when Danny was riding the best horses on the grounds and winning all kinds of stakes- he tried harder than any other horse he rode at the main summer meeting.
The point is that I was not trying to do anything illegal or skirt the rules (a milkshake was an uncommon procedure for thoroughbreds then and not illegal either) but just trying to help my horse a bit and give him a chance to win a race.
Don�t know if you saw the Privman note in the form when Adam Kitchingman got caught with a milkshake (wonder what flavor?) but Adam�s comments were excellent and realistic �simply trying to do his best for his clients to win races in a competitive environment.
Many players have been saying for years that the vet�s name should be included in the pp�s, along side the owner and trainer. And if you want to carry it to its logical extreme, all pre-race treatments and medications from calcium jugs to tapping one or more joints should be listed.� This might clear up a lot of illusions about �kinky and/or designer medications�.
Then again there was always the truth: favorite backstretch saying: �The best hop is a drop!�
HANDICAP YOURSELF:
HORSES ARE JUST PART OF THE GAME
by Richard Hartley

Gordon Pine, the noted US handicapper, wrote recently that is, as a player, you are not �handicapping yourself� then you are actually handicapping yourself.
What he meant, of course, was that if you do not look after yourself as a horseplayer then your betting activities will be handicapped, or in other words, badly impaired.
I think he�s right. Over the years I have kept a constant check on lyself, making adjustments on the way I think about the races, how I analyze the past performances, and how I decide upon a bet. (I�m talking about objective critical thinking and not emotional reactions.)
Whatever success I�ve known as a player has come from the ongoing look into myself and why I make decision (the why of handicapping and the why of betting psychology).
I know some players who are making the same errors today that they were making 20 years ago. They wonder how some people can win while they keep losing.
One of these players asked me recently what it was that I was doing right compared to what he was doing wrong. I�ve known the man since we were in the university together. I told him directly:
You�ve never really changed. Your the same player you were when we were in college together. I tried to explain that what we learn is not enough. It is also what we discard as unuseful and counterproductive.
He admitted that bad habits were hard to leave behind. In theory, he understood what I meant, but in practice it was hard for him to take me seriously, maybe because we knew each other. So I quoted Gordon Pine:
�If you want to make money at the track, handicapping yourself is more important than handicapping the horses. Handicapping is a filtering process.�
In essence, I added, paraphrasing Mr. Pine, handicapping is choosing the right subsets from all the possible categories of past performance and betting decisions. Your justification for filtering out the worst subsets and keeping the best ones could be as simple as which handicapping factors do the best and worst for you: pace or pedigree; horse or trainer; comprehensive handicapping or angles; etc. But this may also analyze betting decisions: whether you do better or worse betting on a single horse or doing a combination wager; whether you handicap in a quiet place and reflect or you are better under the stress of last minute intensity.
Pine insists on keeping records, and knowing which categories lead to profits and which ones lead to a loss, and knowing this objectively. Record keeping! �Isn�t ironic,� he writes, �that the one thing that can help us the most is the last thing most of us want to do!�
Gordon�s thrust is that we owe it to ourselves to keep a close eye on all that we do with our betting, including a very close check on all our bets that work out. Which ones win, which ones lose, which classes of race are letting us down?
We can extend this to trainers, meets, race tracks, and including how stupid we are when it comes to betting. How many terrible mistakes do we make, why did we make them, and do we repeat them?
How many times have you set out for the day full of good intentions only to discard them after the first couple of races? How many times have you carefully drawn up plan for the day been dumped, with disastrous results ... or the other way around ... how often have you been unable to make adjustments based on objective information or odds.
If you really care about your end results, then you�ll take stock of yourself on a regular basis, learning to discriminate between good investment opportunities and the need for useless action, tightening your discipline.
My friend Bob may not ever be able to change his ways, but I have seen some horseplayers turn it around, once they learn that it can be exciting to change one�s ways, but that such change should be based on a critical view of one�s horseplaying past.

QUEST STAR AND THE QUEST FOR PROFITS
Dave wanted to give me credit for having had the top two finishers of the Florida Derby in order, and I had to give him the bad news: that I deserve no credit. Anyone could have named those two horses and for that reason, I leaned on my third choice Vicarage as the potential overlay, I had an unusual argument for that horse, and in the end, my two mild doubts (the distance and coming back so soon) probably did the horse in. Whether striking the gate on his way out affected Vicarage�s result is open for debate, since the crunch caused him to get out slowly, in eighth place, and then be rushed up. I seriously doubt if a clear start would have improved his performance enough. No regrets and no credit. We lost.
On the other hand, the information I gave for the male marathon race, the Pan American, was profitable for a reasonably good decision-maker, based on money management articles in previous C&X issues. The two horses I highlighted, my key Quest Star, #8 at 8-1, and the Mitchell horse, number 6 Deputy Lad at even higher odds, finished a close up second and third respectively, barely beaten by an obvious 2-1 horse, Navesink River.
Early pace in a marathon race
I had mentioned that this particular pace configuration favored early speed because there was little early pace. Examining the pace lines of their last race, you could see that Navesink River had considerably more early speed than Gigli, the other horse fancied by the public.
My job was to provide reasoning for price horses and let you do the rest. Impossible for me to know in advance all the possible wagering decisions. That depends on the way the odds materialize on the toteboard. With both Quest Star and Deputy Lad ending up at big odds, it made sense to use the key horse Quest Star as an exacta-as-place bet under Navesink and any other horse you thought could walk. Following a similar logic, Quest Star and Deputy Lad could be used as to parts of a 3-horse trifecta boxes (trifecta as place-show bet):
8-6-X, 8-6-Y, and 8-6-Z. The X-Y should be the faves and the Z should be added if you see a worthy tote-blaster.
In general, turf marathons offer an advantage for an early speed horse, for the pace slows down notably. Even from 1 3/8 to 1 1/2 there�s a different mentality among riders. They know they�ve got to save their horses at a mile and a half. The slow-down helps the early leaders and works against come-from-behind horses. Marathon fields often attract long-winded closers, whose trainers feel their horses have a better chance to get up in time. The opposite is usually true. I�d rather have a closer at a flat mile than at a mile and a half.
In the case of Gigli, you can see the difference in his top two pp lines. When the pace was fast, he caught the speed and nearly inherited the win, outfinishing Navesink River. But when the pace was slow, Navesink River had the advantage over him. The pace in the Pan American figured to be slow.
I had to decide which races to do several days in advance. I picked out the two turf marathons, looking for the pace advantage. Unfortunately, the Orchid was so void of early pace that there was not a single legit front runner. This created a chaos situation.
As slow as Elieonthemarch was, she was somewhat favored by the pace configuration. But on fractions I projected Briviesca in front of her, and mentioned on our site that Briviesca�s fortunes depended on the type of ride she�d get from Bailey.
My argument was rather iffy. Never did I expect that everyone in the grandstand would have done the same figures I did and envisioned the same race shape. With Briviesca at 3-2, it became apparent that I had discovered nothing different from the rest of the crowd. Longtime followers of yours truly know that it is impossible for me to grind out a profit with 3-2 horses and I would never try.
But betting style is really up to you, and depends on what type of decision making makes you comfortable. C&X can publish articles on decision making and do analysis of races, but not being able to see how the toteboard materializes until after our analysis is published, we are not in a position to recommend decisions on specific races. It would be great if we could find some way to gather together, and then we�d see the board together. Maybe some of you might be considering traveling to Canterbury this summer for the Claiming Crown. Barring an unexpected obstacle, I�ll be there.
Why we can rarely anticipate odds in advance
The striking example is Quest Star. He was second choice in the consensus. He seemed like the horse to beat. Evidently, the public still overvalues finish position and undervalues pace and form cycle. No way I could have anticipated that this pace advantage horse would go off at 8-1. The exacta-as-place bet and trifecta as place-show bet methods kick in when your key horse(s) is/are overlays at 6-1 or up. I figured Quest Star should have been about 5-2. Hell, that�s what he paid for place.
Nope. No way to have anticipated Quest Star�s odds the night before.
Quest Star�s prep race �looked� worse than his the previous preps leading to his 2003 and 2004 Pan American victories. (I had checked into his career record.) But as I noted, he�d started from an outside post, raced wide, and pushed an overly fast early pace. Under the circumstances, the fact that he dropped back and finished so far behind Gigli was of no concern to me.
I�m satisfied with having picked out the two longshots in a tri that came back $153.40 for a buck. But I would have preferred to have the result come out so neatly, that no matter what the betting decision, everyone wins. I consider myself a provider of information but not a tout. There�s a blurry line between those two categories that leaves me uncomfortable.
The lesson remains clear: look for slow-paced mile-and-a-half marathons, and find a key horse that figures to control the pace.

THE LAST WORD:
INAPPROPRIATELY UNCOUPLED?
by Nick Kling, with thanks to the Troy Record

��� �Several years ago New York racing officials tried an experiment.� A change in
the state Thoroughbred racing law allowed multiple horses from the same trainer to
compete as separate betting interests in certain non-claiming races.� Trainer entries
remained coupled in the wagering for all claiming events and in situations where the
horses had common ownership.
��� �From an artistic standpoint, uncoupled entries worked well.� Maiden and lower
level allowance races often had more betting interests as a result of the rule.� The
additional wagering choices generally produced better payoffs for winning players.�
What's not to like about that?
��� �Unfortunately, the uncoupling rule ran afoul of a few members of the racing
media.� When horsemen with larger maiden populations occasionally won with the longer-
priced animal, the whining and bleating from these denizens of the press box could
have been heard a thousand miles away.�
��� �Under the guise of "protecting" the helpless Thoroughbred bettor, a few
ringleaders for repeal began a campaign to get state regulators to rescind the
uncoupling rule.� Rare is the political functionary that can withstand bad press, even
when misguided.� Racing officials caved and retreated to the old regulations.
��� �Ironically, reversion back to full-coupling missed significant loopholes just
as likely to produce frustrated bettors.� Racing jurisdictions all over the nation
have brothers, cousins, parents and children, and spouses that race horses as uncoupled
betting entries.� New York is no exception.
��� �There are examples in New York where questions could arise from nothing more
than circumstantial evidence.� Father and son conditioners Leo and Keith O'Brien run
as separate betting interests.� However, they have stabled in the same barn at times
and horses trained by Leo in one race have shown up under Keith's banner in a
subsequent outing.
��� �Thoroughbreds trained by another father and son, Jose and Carlos Martin, have
switched barns from one race to the next.� Brothers Bob and Steve Klesaris race as
uncoupled entries, even though both claim many animals and have started horses in the
same claiming events.
��� �What about races where a prominent owner like Sandy Goldfarb has a horse from
one of his secondary trainers starting in an event where his primary conditioner
Richard E. Dutrow Jr. has an entrant from a different owner?� Why is this scenario
less likely to create a questionable situation?
��� �My observation of racing at Aqueduct this winter led me to examine the results
of races where brothers Richard and Anthony Dutrow had horses in the same event.� Sons
of legendary Maryland and New York-based conditioner Richard Dutrow Sr., Rick and Tony
are among the most successful horsemen on the East Coast.
��� �Since January 1, 2004, there have been at least sixteen races at Aqueduct over
the fifteen-month period where the Dutrow brothers both had a starter.� The results are
fascinating, but do not necessarily indicate anything more than coincidence.
��� �A Dutrow-trained horse won nine of those sixteen events.� Five of the victors
came from the Rick Dutrow barn, the other four were trained by Tony.� That pencils out
to a 56 percent combined winning rate for the two brothers, similar to what you would
get if you added each one's percentage for all starters.
��� �Four of the nine Dutrow winners went to post at longer odds than the other
brother's losing entrant.� Five were a shorter price.� If you had bet $2.00 on each
of the 33 Dutrow horses in the specified sixteen races, you would have invested
$66.00 and gotten a return of $143.30.� That produced a net profit of $77.30 and a
stratospheric return on investment (ROI) of $4.34 per wager.
��� �However, take it one step further.� If you had bet the same $2.00 on ONLY the
longer-priced Dutrow entrant, you would have done better.� $34.00 wagered brought
back $112.00, a net of $78.00, and an ROI of $6Anthony+Dutrow+had+horses+in+the+same+event.%CA+Sons%0D%0Aof+legendary+Maryland+and+New+York-based+conditioner+Richard+Dutrow+Sr.%2C+Rick+and+Tony%0D%0Aare+among+the+most+successful+horsemen+on+the+East+Coast.%0D%0A%CA%CA%CA+%CASince+January+1%2C+2004%2C+there+have+been+at+least+sixteen+races+at+Aqueduct+over%0D%0Athe+fifteen-month+period+where+the+Dutrow+brothers+both+had+a+starter.%CA+The+results+are%0D%0Afascinating%2C+but+do+not+necessarily+indicate+anything+more+than+coincidence.+%0D%0A%CA%CA%CA+%CAA+Dutrow-trained+horse+won+nine+of+those+sixteen+events.%CA+Five+of+the+victors%0D%0Acame+from+the+Rick+Dutrow+barn%2C+the+other+four+were+trained+by+Tony.%CA+That+pencils+out+%0D%0Ato+a+56+percent+combined+winning+rate+for+the+two+brothers%2C+similar+to+what+you+would%0D%0Aget+if+you+added+each+one%27s+percentage+for+all+starters.%0D%0A%CA%CA%CA+%CAFour+of+the+nine+Dutrow+winners+went+to+post+at+longer+odds+than+the+other+%0D%0Abrother%27s+losing+entrant.%CA+Five+were+a+shorter+price.%CA+If+you+had+bet+%242.00+on+each+%0D%0Aof+the+33+Dutrow+horses+in+the+specified+sixteen+races%2C+you+would+have+invested+%0D%0A%2466.00+and+gotten+a+return+of+%24143.30.%CA+That+produced+a+net+profit+of+%2477.30+and+a%0D%0Astratospheric+return+on+investment+%28ROI%29+of+%244.34+per+wager.%0D%0A%CA%CA%CA+%CAHowever%2C+take+it+one+step+further.%CA+If+you+had+bet+the+same+%242.00+on+ONLY+the%0D%0Alonger-priced+Dutrow+entrant%2C+you+would+have+done+better.%CA+%2434.00+wagered+brought+%0D%0Aback+%24112.00%2C+a+net+of+%2478.00%2C+and+an+ROI+of+%246Anthony%2BDutrow%2Bhad%2Bhorses%2Bin%2Bthe%2Bsame%2Bevent.%25CA%2BSons%250D%250Aof%2Blegendary%2BMaryland%2Band%2BNew%2BYork-based%2Bconditioner%2BRichard%2BDutrow%2BSr.%252C%2BRick%2Band%2BTony%250D%250Aare%2Bamong%2Bthe%2Bmost%2Bsuccessful%2Bhorsemen%2Bon%2Bthe%2BEast%2BCoast

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